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Abstract. The operational performance of a set of simple monetary pol-
icy rules à la Taylor in a model with capital accumulation and nominal and real
rigidities is discussed with a special emphasis on the volatility of output, nominal
rate and ination rate. Within an enriched modelling framework it is shown that
output targeting plays a more crucial role than what has been assessed in the current
literature for models without capital accumulation. In fact, with a small value of
the output targeting coe¢ cient, monetary authority is not completely successfull in
stabilizing the volatility of output, nominal rate and ination rate only by acting on
ination targeting. Moreover, a too strong concerns towards ination relatively to
output translates into a lower ability to control ination volatility, together with a
strong policy reaction with respect to an exogenous shock hitting the economy. Im-
pulse response analysis shows that the risk of an excessive concerns towards ination
might end up in counterproductive results on output, after a positive technological
shock. The model also shows a better internal propagation mechanism than what
has been previously showed. Finally, the results show that it is no longer possible
to miss capital accumulation in modelling monetary policy analyses and calls for
further generalizations of the existing modelling framework.
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1. Introduction
This paper shows the crucial role played by the output targeting parameter in a monetary
policy function à la Taylor in implementing successful stabilization plans. In fact, if a
Taylor-type rule presents an ination targeting parameter too high, this could induce a
recession and could prevent the econonomy from taking advantage of a positive shocks.
Moreover, a relatively high ination targeting coe¢ cient (with respect to output) might
also induce output instability. The dyamic is simple: the fear towards the increase of
expected ination can force central bank in setting interest rates so high that a recession
might occur even if the economy is hit by a positive technological schock. The main
message from this paper is that if monetary authority wants to minimize variable uc-
tuations, it has to actively work on both ination and output targets. The key element
in the explanation of this results lies in the high level of persistency associated to the
economy under analysis, generated by the presence of real and nominal rigidities.
From previous research we know that in order to simultaneously achieve welfare maxi-
mization, and determinacy, monetary policy parameters have to be within a well specied
region. However, the question is: what the choice of these parameters does imply in
terms of volatility in a model with capital accumulation and real rigidities ? This is the
question to be answered in the following pages.
In recent years, the economic profession has taken a big e¤ort in studying the opera-
tional performance of monetary policy rules. The main goal of this literature is to provide
conclusions about the size of monetary policy parameters, by using a criterion function
derived or directly imposed on the model. The conclusions found by this literature is that
a simple Taylor rule where nominal rate reacts to contemporaneous ination and output
maximizes the welfare of the representative agent when the ination targeting parameter
is higher than the output targeting parameter.
In this paper the impact on volatility and persistency in a model with capital ac-
cumulation and real and nominal rigidities is studied with respect to the magnitude of
parameters of monetary policy rules. The focus here is on the evaluation of simple
Taylor rules with respect to their impact on the volatility of output, nominal rate and
ination rate. The modelling strategy considers an explicit role of nominal rigidities,
modeled via quadratic cost of price adjustment à la Rotemberg (1982), with capital ac-
cumulation. Real Rigidities are inserted via cost of capital installation along the lines
proposed by Lubik (2000). This paper lies within the recent developments of Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium monetary models, mixing the Real Business Cycles (RBC,
henceforth) modelling framework together with the microfoundations of nominal rigidi-
ties, forming the standard apparatus of Keynesian models. This literature started with
the work by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) who built a very simple dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model without capital accumulation with price rigidities. Other
remarkable examples of variations on the same themes are the collection of papers in the
book edited by Taylor (1999). This literature su¤ers of an important drawback: there
is no capital accumulation. Monetary policy is e¤ective if it is able to a¤ect real rate,
which, in a model without investment choice and truly intertemporal allocation problem,
remains an exogenous shock. The role of capital accumulation in monetary models has
been studied by Kim (2000), Casares and McCallum (2001) and Neiss and Pappa (2002).
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None of these papers, however, examined the operational performance of interest rate
rules along a specic criterion (volatility or welfare).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to the
description of the modelling setup, with a complete discussion about the assumptions
underlying the consumers and rms behavior. A following section is devoted to the dis-
cussion of monetary policy rules analyzed in the paper, together with a description of the
scal policy reaction function. The calibration analysis, the solution method and other
computational details are the subject of section 4. Section 5 reports volatility results
together with a brief discussion on the e¤ects of changing some parameters characterizing
the degree of competition in the economy. Section 6 discussed the impact of monetary
policy parameters choice on the internal dynamic of the model showing the pattern of im-
pulse response function for output, nominal rate and ination rate for di¤erent monetary
policy parameterschoice. Concluding remarks in section 7 closes up the paper.
2. The Model
The model is populated by a large number of consumers and rms. Each representative
agent in both nal goods and capital markets acts as a price taker. He (She) consumes
a large variety of nal goods, each produced by a di¤erent rm, accumulates capital and
rents it to rms. Each agent can consume and invest a composite good formed by the
total amount of varieties j 2 [0; 1] produced by each single rm.
2.1. The consumers side. The economy is populated by many identical households
indexed on the real line i 2 [0; 1]. Each households optimizes over an innite horizon the
following utility function:
Ut = Et
1X
t=0
u (Cit; Lit) (1)
where Cit and Lit indicate the amount of consumption and labor e¤ort supplied on labor
market by each i -th represented agent, respectively. The instantaneous utility function
u (Cit; Lit) is assumed to be:
u (Cit; Lit) =
h
C
(1 )
it (1  Lit)
i(1  1 ) 
1  1
 (2)
The utility function (1)-(2) is optimized with respect to the following intertemporal
budget constraint for each agent i:
Bit
Pt
+
Mit  Mit 1
Pt
+ Cit (1 + tf (Vit)) + Iit = ZitKit +WitLit + (3)
+Rt 1
Bit 1
Pt
+
Z 1
0
i (j) 
t (j) dj   Tit
Additionally, I assume that capital stock Kit owned by each agent i evolves according
to the following equation:
Kit = 

Iit 1
Kit 1

Kit 1 + (1  )Kit 1 (4)
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where Iit is the amount of investment at time t, and  is the depreciation rate on the
capital stock. From (4), investment is productive next period and the stock of capital is
predetermined.
From equation (3), each agent i enters a time t with a predetermined stock of capital
Kit, nominal bond holdings Bit, and nominal money holdings Mit. Moreover, the rep-
resentative agent receives its wage income times unit of labor worked, WitLit, the rental
income from investment in physical capital ZitKit, where Zit is the rental rate on capital,
and the return (gross) on the investment in government bonds Rt 1
Bit 1
Pt
. In (3), Rt in-
dicates the gross nominal interest rate. Moreover, each agent i participates in the prot
of each rm j through a constant share i (j) on the prot of rm j; 
jt. I assume that
prot share i (j) is constant over time and is out of the control of each single agent. This
is done in order to simplify the analytical solution of the model and to save a rst order
condition. In what follows, I assume also the existence of a set of complete markets: this
is a simplifying assumption to allow a simple relationship between the discount factor of
households and that of rms.
From (2) and (3), money is introduced with a liquidity cost function inserted in the
representative agents budget constraint, as discussed, among others, by Sims (1994).
The approach taken here assumes that each agent incurs into a cost tf (Vit) in order
to make a transaction. Therefore, to consume an amount Cit each agent should plan
to spend an amount equal to Cit (1 + tf (Vit)) to complete the transaction. I assume
that f (Vit) is assumed to be linear: f (Vit) = Vit, where Vit is money velocity, dened
as Vit = PtCitMit . As showed by Sims (1994), the functional form of f (Vit) is crucial
to determine the existence and the stability of an equilibrium for real money balances.
The assumption of convex transaction costs (f
00
(Vit)  0) rules out indeterminacy under
activemonetary policy and the existence of a barter equilibrium for this economy1 .
In equation (4) I inserted real rigidities through the cost of capital installments cap-
tured by function 

Iit 1
Kit 1

, along the same lines of Lubik (2000). Function  (:) is
assumed to have the following properties 0 (:) > 0, 00 (:) > 0. According to the formu-
lation adopted in (4), one unit of investment Iit adds only 

Iit
Kit

Kit units of capital to
the next periods capital stock. Here, the q-theory is replaced by a -theory of the house-
holds, where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to investment constraint, measured
in terms of marginal utility.
Money velocity shock t is modelled via an AR(1) process:
log t =  log
 
t 1

+
 
1  

log () + "t (5)
where "t is a i.i.d. random variable normally distributed N

0; 2

. Such type of shocks
can be alternatively inserted as preference shock, when real money balances enter directly
into the utility function.
The consumption bundle Cit is an aggregate of all the j 2 [0; 1] varieties of goods
1For the discussion about the inuence of functional form of transaction cost function on the determi-
nacy of the equilibrium see Sims (1994).
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produced in this economy, described by:
Cit =
Z 1
0
cit (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
(6)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties of goods produced by
each rm j, with  > 1. Equation (6) is CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution)
aggregator, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). To determine the optimal allocation across
varieties of nal goods, each consumer maximizes equation (6) subjected to the constraint
that spending on all goods varieties
R 1
0
pt (j) c
i
t (j) must not exceed aggregate expenditure
PtCit. The solution to the allocation program leads to the following constant-elasticity
inverse demand function:
cit (j)
Cit
=

pt (j)
Pt
 
(7)
where pt (j) is the price of variety j and Pt is the general price index dened as:
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt (j)
1 
dj
 1
1 
(8)
The nal goods aggregator (6) together with (7) and (8), dene the so called intra-
temporal optimization problem of the representative agent. When we aggregate Cit and
cit (j) across all agents i; we get the aggregate demand for nal goods and for variety j,
given, respectively, by: Yt =
R 1
0
Citdi and Yjt =
R 1
0
cit (j) di, for all j 2 [0; 1].
2.2. Intertemporal First-Order Conditions. The optimal intertemporal alloca-
tion is obtained via the maximization of the utility (1)-(2) subjected to the intertemporal
budget constraint (3) and the accumulation constraint (4). The rst order conditions with
respect to Cit, Lit, Mit, Bit, Kit; Iit are, respectively:
(1  )C(1 )(1 
1
 ) 1
it (1  Lit)(1 
1
 ) = t (1 + 2tVit) (9)
C
(1 )(1  1 )
it (1  Lit)(1 
1
 ) 1 = tWt (10)
Et
t+1
Pt+1
=
 
1  tV 2it
 t
Pt
(11)
RtEt
t+1
Pt+1
=
t
Pt
(12)
Ett+1

1   +

Iit
Kit

  0

Iit
Kit

Iit
Kit

+ tZt = t (13)
Ett+1
0

Iit
Kit

= t (14)
In (9)-(14) t, t are, respectively, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the representative
agents budget constraint (3) and to capital accumulation constraint (4): t represents
marginal utility of consumption, while t indicates marginal utility of capital.
Equation (9) equates the marginal utility of consumption to t, while from equation
(10) the disutility of labor e¤ort equates the utility value of real wage. Equation (11)
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is the First Order condition on money holdings and (12) represents the Euler equation
obtained as optimal bond allocation. Finally, equations (13) - (14) indicate the optimal
allocation choice between capital and investment. In particular, from (13), we have that
the optimal allocation of a marginal unit of capital is governed by its marginal productivity
(equal to the rental rate) tZt, the discounted contribution to next periods capital stock
(1  )Ett+1, and the contributions to the reduction of the adjustment cost overall
 0

Iit
Kit

Iit
Kit
.
The set of FOCs (9)-(14) is completed by the constraints (3), (4), by the stochastic
process (5) and by two Transversality Conditions on bonds and capital.
From (11)-(12) we derive money demand as:
Mit
PtCit
= 
1
2
t

Rt   1
Rt
 1
2
(15)
The elasticity of money demand with respect to nominal interest rate is approximately
equal to   12R , which, for a nominal interest rate equal to 6%, (the approximate historical
value of the Federal Funds Rate for US, 1959:1-2001:4), produces a value of 0:47; slightly
bigger number than what we observe in the data (around 0.2).
2.3. Firms. I assume the existence of a large number of rm indexed by j 2 [0; 1] ;
each producing a single good variety. With respect to the varieties of nal goods supplied
by other competitors, each rm acts as a price taker. The production function for the
rm j producing Yjt units of output of the variety j is:
Yjt = AtK

jt
 
gtyLjt
(1 )   t (16)
where Kjt and Ljt, respectively, indicate the amount of capital stock and labor employed
in the production process. Moreover, At is a technological shock common to all j-rms.
In (16) I assume the presence of a xed cost of production represented by t, common
to all rms. Intuitively, in each period t an amount equal to t must be employed for
administration purposes. This cost can be interpreted as a pure cost necessary to start
up with the business. The determination of the steady state level of t, , is obtained by
imposing a zero-prot condition on the representative rm in the long run.
A su¢ cient condition for prot maximization is to require t to be non-negative.
For At and t we assume the following representation (in logs):
log (At) = A log (At 1) + (1  A) log (A) + "At (17)
log (t) =  log (t 1) + (1  ) log () (18)
where A and , respectively, represent the steady state values of At and t, respectively;
moreover, "At is an i.i.d. normally distributed random variable with N
 
0; 2A

.
To introduce nominal rigidities, each rm who wants to change her product prices has
to pay a penalty in terms of output equal to Yt. The price adjustment cost function is
assumed to be:
ACPt (j) =
P
2

Pt (j)
Pt 1 (j)
  
2
Yt (19)
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where P is the adjustment cost parameter and  is the steady state gross ination rate.
From (19) the cost of price adjustment is measured in terms of the nal output and
increases in a proportional way with the overall size of the economy Yt.
2.4. Prot Maximization. The presence of price adjustment cost given by (19)
makes the prot maximization problem of the rm dynamic. The optimal choice of
input and prices is done through the maximization of the future stream of prot evalu-
ated with the stochastic pricing kernel t for contingent claims, assumed to be the rms
discount factor. Thus, each rm maximizes:
max
fKt(j);Lt(j)g
E0
" 1X
t=0
t
t (j)
#
(20)
subject to:

t (j) = Pt (j)Yjt  WtLjt   PtRtKjt   PtACPt (j) (21)
given the demand for di¤erentiated products given by (7), after having aggregated over
all i 2 [0; 1] agents in the economy, and the price adjustment cost function given by (19).
The rst order conditions with respect to Kjt and Ljt are, respectively:
Rt
Pt
= 

Yjt +tG
t
Kjt

Pt (j)
Pt

1  1
"t (j)

(22)
Wt
Pt
= (1  )

Yjt +tG
t
Ljt

Pt (j)
Pt

1  1
"t (j)

(23)
where "t (j) is the output demand elasticity, including the price adjustment cost, whose
analytic expression is given by:
1
"t (j)
=
1


1  p

Pt (j)
Pt 1 (j)
  

Pt
Pt 1 (j)
Yt
Yjt
+ Et

t+1
t
p

Pt+1 (j)
Pt (j)
  

Pt+1
Pt (j)
Pt+1 (j)
Pt (j)
Yt+1
Yjt

(24)
Equation (24) measures the gross markup of price over marginal costs. Without cost of
price adjustments, i.e. when p = 0, the markup would be

 1 , constant over marginal
cost. If  !1 and p = 0, then the markup becomes constant and equal to 1. With the
intertemporal dimension considered in this model, both technology and demand shocks
a¤ect the cyclical properties of the markup, which becomes one of the shockstransmission
channels.
3. Policy Rules
3.1. Monetary Policy Rules. The type of monetary policy rules analyzed here be-
long to a general class of interest-rate pegging rules (in log linear form) as2 :
eRt = TiX
l=1
Rl eRt l + TX
l=0
let l + TyX
l=0
yl eYt l + Mt (25)
2The variables of the model are all expressed in log-linear form. Thus, ezt stays for the deviation of
logZt from its steady state level logZ:
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where eRt is a measure of the nominal (gross) interest rate in period t used by monetary
authority as instrument (the Federal Funds Rate in US), et is the (gross) ination rate.
Moreover, eYt indicates the actual output and Mt is an exogenous monetary policy shock.
According to (25), nominal interest rate controlled by Central Bank depends from the
past history of output, ination and nominal interest rate. In the present paper I focus
only on rules without interest smoothing obtained by setting Rl = 0 for all l in (25).
In (25) Mt indicates a monetary policy shock, for which I consider a general speci-
cation under the form of an AR(1) process as follows:
log
 
Mt

= M log
 
Mt 1

+ (1  M ) log
 
M

+ "Mt (26)
with "Mt v N
 
0; 2M

, i.i.d. process. This assumption is made in order to guarantee a
better persistency to policy e¤ects, as remarked by Furher and Moore (1995).
The simplest Taylor Rule I am going to examine assumed as a benchmark is:
Rule 1: eRt = et + y eYt + eMt (27)
Coe¢ cients , y represent the strength to which monetary authority decides to react to
shocks to ination rate and output. Taylor (1993) sets  = 1:5, y = 0:5 and nds that
this rule mimics quite well the pattern of nominal interest rate in the period 1974-1993
for the US economy. By setting y = 0:0 in (27) we obtain a pure ination targeting
rule.
A variant of rule (27) considers nominal interest rate as reacting to expected ination,
in place of the contemporaneous ination rate. This is motivated by two reasons: rst,
it is reasonable to think that monetary authority has some informative advantage in
discovering the signals of incoming ination. An expected ination targeting rule (Rule
2) is: eRt = Etet+1 + y eYt + eMt (28)
As for rule (27), by setting y = 0:0 in (28) we obtain a pure expected ination targeting
rule.
3.2. Fiscal Policy. Consider the following governments budget constraint, in real
terms:
Bt
Pt
+
Mt
Pt
= (1 + it 1)
Bt 1
Pt
+
Mt 1
Pt
+Gt   Tt (29)
In (29) Tt is the level of real lump sum taxes, while Bt and Mt indicates the stock of
public debt and money issued by the government and held by investors. Bonds, money
and taxes are aggregated as: Bt =
R 1
0
Bitdi, Mt =
R 1
0
M itdi, Tt =
R 1
0
T it di:
The interactions between scal and monetary policy are crucial in the determination of
the price level. Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) have shown that to achieve full price stability
we need to include a specic scal policy rule, given by:
Tt =  0 +  1
Bt 1
Pt
(30)
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from (30) taxes react to real debt with a coe¢ cient  1 whose magnitude is set in order
to guarantee an upper bound in the growth rate of real debt,  0 is a constant term
3 .
According to Leeper (1991), a passivescal policy is when
 
 1   1 <  1 <   1   1;
otherwise, a scal policy is said to be active.
Public expenditure Gt is modelled via an AR(1) as:
log (Gt) = G log (Gt 1) + (1  G) log (G) + "Gt (31)
where "Tt is i.i.d. variable normally distributed, such that "
G
t v N
 
0; 2G

.
In this setting, scal policy is not neutral, even without distortionary taxation or
nite lives. The transmission channel of the shocks included in the model is o¤ered by
the budget constraint of private sector. This can be done only via the implementation of
a scal policy rule like (30), or a similar one. In fact, consequences on scal policy from
monetary authority are not negligible, even if seigniorage revenues are small.
4. Steady State and Calibration
4.1. Steady State. In the system reduction process, I impose a condition of symmetry
on the variables indexed by i and j, by setting Xt (j) = Xt and xit (j) = xt, for all
i; j 2 [0; 1] : In this way, all rms and consumers choose the identical set of behavioral
relationship. This asssumption avoids to keep track of the entire price distribution among
various rms.
As it is customary in the RBC literature, all variables of the present model are trans-
formed by assuming the existence of a Balanced Growth Path (BGP, henceforth). The
relationship between the discount factors of the transformed economy and that of the
non-transformed economy is given by: x = g
(1 1=)(1 )
y , where gy is the output growth
rate on a BGP. Moreover, after combining the representative agents budget constraint
and the Government budget constraint, we get the following expression for the Social
Resource constraint:
Ct (1 + V ) + It +Gt = Yt

1  p
2
(t   )2

I also assume that each agent has access to a set of complete markets for contingent claims.
This allows to get a unique discount factor for consumers and rms on the basis of the
following condition:
t+1
t
= x
t+1
t
This condition can be simply rationalized by assuming the existence of a representative
agent who freely engage a set of exchanges of the rms share at zero transaction costs.
An additional rst order condition will produce the same type of equation.
Moreover, combining equations (13) -(14) we get:
xEtt+1

1   +

It
Kt

  0

It
Kt

It
Kt
+0

It
Kt

Zt

= gyt (32)
3 It is no di¢ cult to show that a scal policy rule of the type designed above encompasses many other
scal policy rules, like f.e. balanced budget rules. See Cochrane (1998) for further details.
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If we impose the steady state condition on equation (32) we get:
1   + Z = gy
x
(33)
which highlights the relationship between the rental rate Z, and the real rate of return
gy=x. From the above relationships, we observe that the capital transaction costs do
not a¤ect the steady state of the model.
4.2. Calibration. The model is calibrated on quarterly observation based on the US
economy (sample (1959:1 - 2001:4). The main parameters of the model are contained in
Table 1 below:
Parameter x    gy  1    k
Value 0.997 0.33 0.64 0.1 1.004 free 0.025 0.106 10 0.1
Table 1
From steady state relationship existing between nominal and real interest rate derived
from (12), we have R = 
 1
x . The discount rate of the transformed economy has been set
equal to x = 0:997: This value implies that the discount factor of the non-transformed
economy is 1.0071. The growth rate of real GDP in the sample period is 1.76%, equivalent
to gy = 1:0044 per quarter. The nominal interest rate is set accordingly to the mean
value of the Federal Funds Rate which, over the specied sample period, is given by 6.47%
per year, (1.61% in quarterly terms). Given such informations, we nd that from (12)
the ination rate is 1.009499, equivalent to 3.8% in annual terms, very close to empirical
observations.
Therefore, the real interest rate is given by gy=x = 1:0066, equivalent to 2.64% in
annual terms. If  = 0:025, as in the largest part of RBC studies, the rental rate of capital
from (33) is Z = 0:0316, which is a value very close to that obtained in other studies.
The share of consumption over GDP, Sc as been set equal to 0.57, as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999). From our dataset, the value of velocity V , turns out to be V = 0:33.
If we assume that the total transaction costs are 2% of GDP, we have that: ScV =
0:02; from which we get  = 0:106:
The share of capital in production is  = 0:33, as it is customary in RBC literature.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution  is set to 0.1, implying a degree of risk
aversion equal to 10: this is a compromise value between  = 0:17 adopted by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999), and  = 0:085, adopted by Kim (2000), in an estimated model,
similar to the present one.
From data, the ratio of market L to non-market (1   L) activities is L=(1   L) =
0:289017, from which we nd L = 0:2243:
From (9)-(10) we calibrate the share of leisure in the utility , given by  = 0:79: The
capital/output ratio implied by the model is given by K=Y = =Z = 10:44, very close to
the values reported in the literature (see, for example, Christiano, 1991).
As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), I x the share of public expenditure to GDP
equal to Sg = 0:2. From the social resource constraint, we obtain a share of investment
over GDP equal to SI = 0:21.
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Parameter A is calibrated in order to match the steady state value of output from US
data, given4 by 20.12. The elasticity of substitution across di¤erentiated goods  is set
equal to 10, implying a mark up of 1.1, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
A di¢ cult parameter to pin down is p. Ireland (1997) and Kim (2000) have values
for this parameter derived from empirical estimates. In what follows p is basically left
as a free parameter and it is set equal to 4, a value close to the number obtained by
Ireland (1997), where p = 3:45. It should be clear, however, that this is just a working
hypothesis.
The investment adjustment cost function is assumed to be zero in the steady state so
that:  (I=K) = I=K, 
0
(I=K) = 1 where I=K is the steady state investment/capital
ratio set equal to 0.025. Because of this characteristics, the investment adjustment
cost a¤ects the model only in the neighborhood of the steady state. The elasticity of the
marginal adjustment cost function dened as  1k =   (0=00)I=K, entirely determines
the speed of adjustment together with investment volatility. To generate an empirical
plausible investment volatility k = 0:1, as showed by Lubik (2000). Moreover, I set  1
0.0055, which congures scal policy as to be passive, or Ricardian.
Let vector eFt, be dened as eFt = h eA, et, eit, eTt i0 , so that:
eFt = 
 eFt 1 +t (34)
where t indicates the vector of the disturbances,dened as follows: "t = diag (t) =h
"At ; "

t ; "
i
t; "
T
t
i0
. In (34), the diagonal matrix 
 group the AR(1) coe¢ cients of the
disturbance equations.
The set of autoregressive coe¢ cients is:

 =
2664
A 0 0 0
0  0 0
0 0 M 0
0 0 0 G
3775 =
2664
0:98 0 0 0
0 0:96 0 0
0 0 0:98 0
0 0 0 0:9
3775 (35)
The autocorrelation parameter for the xed-cost deterministic process is taken from
Kim (2000) with  = 0:92:
The variance-covariance matrix of the shocks " is given by:
" =
26664
2A 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 2R 0
0 0 0 2G
37775 =
2664
:000345 0 0 0
0 :001962 0 0
0 0 :0011 0
0 0 0 :0004
3775 (36)
Among the stochastic terms, the parameters
 
A; 
2
A

have been set equal to (0:98; :000345),
while the public expenditure parameters
 
G; 
2
G

, are set to be (0:9; :0004), as in Chari
et al. (2000). For what concerns the parameters of the stochastic process leading t, I
constructed the time series of values for , by assuming that in each year the transaction
4Data are transformed as suggested by Kim (2000).
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costs are 2% per year. Then, I estimated equation (5) over the sample 1959:1-2001:4, by
using Instrumental Variables5 (Instruments chosen: four lagged values of ). The results
of such estimation are (standard errors in brackets):  = :99 (:0016), D.W.: 1.059. The
variance of residuals is 2 = :00196:
To get a value for monetary policy shocks, I estimated a simple monetary policy
reaction function given by:
Rt = RRt 1 +
4X
s=0
st s +
2X
s=0
ysYt s + 
M
t (37)
The sample chosen for the estimation goes from 1979:3 -2001:4, in order to make the
results closest to the analysis of Clarida et al. (2000). Equation (37) has been estimated
by Generalized Method of Moments proposed by Hansen (1982). A selective report of
coe¢ cients is collected in Table 2 (t-statistics in brackets):
0 1 2 y0 y1
1.6 1.45 0.91 0.8 0.2
(2.88) (2.7) (2.62) (2.5) (2.1)
Table 2: Estimated Coe¢ cients of Equation (37)
The R
2
of the regression is 0.78, and the overidentifying restrictions are passed with
a 1% of signicance. The results reported in Table 2 are in line with what has been
reported by Clarida et al. (2000). In particular, the coe¢ cients of ination and output
targeting are slightly bigger than what has been reported by the existing studies.
Finally, by using a LM test, I tested for level of autocorrelation of order 1 of Mt ,
the test statistics of 26.714325, which, compared to 2 (1) ; forces us to reject the null of
absence of autocorrelation of order 1. Furthermore, I estimated regression (26) to get the
value of the coe¢ cient M and the volatility of residuals. The results of such regression
are: M = 0:77 (t-statistics: 7.4), with 
2
R = :0011.
4.3. Solution Method. To solve out the model, I follow a generalization of the ap-
proach taken by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) based on a QZ decomposition method pro-
posed by Sims (2000). According to this method, the model can be written in the
following form:
 0ezt =  1ezt 1 +  2"t +  3 (ezt   Et 1 [ezt]) (38)
where ezt is a vector formed by all the variables of the model expressed as in percentage
deviation from their steady state6 , while "t is a vector formed by the exogenous shocks of
the system (technology, transaction cost, monetary and scal policy). Matrices  0,  1,
 2,  3 are nonlinear function of the deep parameters of the model. If there is a unique
equilibrium, the solution of the model can be displayed as follows:
ezt = 1ezt 1 +2"t (39)
5The overidentifying restrictions are passed with 1% of signicance.
6Note that ezt is dened as ezt = logZt   logZ:
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where matrices 1, 2 are functions of the parameters of the model. By letting gz as the
growth rate of variable Z, the solution (39) can be also rewritten as:
logZt = [(I  1) log z +1 log gz] + [(I  1) log gz] t+
+1 logZt 1 +2"t (40)
with Z, non-transformed variable, z transformed variable, as discussed in Kim (2000).
Now the system is equivalent to a VAR (Vector Autoregression) with a constant and
a time trend. This approach is more stable and can easily handle non-singularities in
the system of equation involved. Second moments matrix b" were computed through a
simulation of the dynamic Lyapunov equations dened as follows:
b" = 1001 +2"02 (41)
where 0 is the initializing matrix is dened as in (36), while 1 and 2 are from (39).
5. Results
5.1. Volatility. In this section I am going to study the impact on volatility determined
by the choice of monetary policy function parameters. The range of parameter chosen for
the simulation is inspired by the choices made by other contributors, in order to make the
results presented here more comparable with the existing literature. The combination
 = 1:5, y = 0:5 is from Taylor (1993), and the value 0.06 for y has been found by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) to be the welfare maximizing value when coupled with
 = 1:22:
Tables 3-8 report the pattern of standard deviation for output, nominal interest rate
and ination rate, under di¤erent parameter congurations, together with the US data
computed over the sample 1959:1-2001:4.
y
0.0 0.06 0.5 3 5 10
y 19.58 6.844 .452 .1361 .06833 .034
 = 1:5 R 3.159 1.1031 .0718 .03 .022 .02
 2.099 0.9782 .1292 .2657 .208 .208
y 4.64 3.66 .84 .082 .22 .06
 = 3 R .745 .587 .13 .022 .04 .023
 .251 .26 .165 .063 .39 .20
y 2.29 2.05 .96 .12 .068 .136
 = 5 R .36 .32 .15 .02 .022 .033
 .079 .091 .11 .068 .062 .27
y 1.16 1.1 .77 .24 .13 .062
 = 10 R .18 .175 .12 .043 .029 .023
 .02 .027 .049 .073 .068 .0619
y 0.77
US R .078
 .66
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Table 3: Taylor Rule 1
The numbers reported in Tables 3-8 were obtained by simulating the model via the
stochastic shocks included in the model: technology shock, monetary policy, transaction
cost shocks and public expenditure shocks7 .
From Table 3, we observe that an ination targeting rule with  = 1:5, y = 10
delivers the lowest degree of output volatility. The volatility of ination drops further
down if we set  = 10, y = 10, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). However, a
pure ination targeting rule (with y = 0:0) produces results in terms of volatility which
are always dominated by any other possible combinations of policy parameters. Thus,
according to the results reported in Table 3, it is never optimal to set y = 0:0:
A second issue concerns the role of coe¢ cient . By raising  we nd a substantial
reduction of ination volatility only if high values of  are accompanied by high values
of y as well: to be successful in terms of stabilization policies, an aggressive ination
targeting policy should never miss the impact on the real side of the economy. The
presence of an AS curve relating expected ination with current ination and output
plays a key role in explaining this result: when y is too low and  is too high, after
an inationary shock the response towards ination turns out to be very strong, implying
a reduction in output. As a consequence, the reduction in output, implies an increase
of the expected ination. So, only a mixed response both towards ination and output
allows to correct the consequences of an inationary shock without causing a recession
and an increase of ination.
The large importance of output targeting coe¢ cient y can be also seen by considering
the asymmetric response of volatility of output with respect to change in , given a
specic value for y. When y = 0:06, we observe that by raising  helps to reduce
output volatility, nominal rate and ination rate. However, when y = 0:5 and  = 1:5
we observe a sharp reduction in the volatility of Y , R, and , but by raising  we nd
an increased volatility of output until we set values of  bigger than 5.
To visualize these results, Figure 1 plots the standard deviation of Y; R,  for di¤erent
values of , taking as xed
8 y = 0:5: In particular, the dark line shows the pattern of
volatility of Y; R and , respectively, for di¤erent values9 of  2 [0; 10], given y = 0:06,
while the dashed line is for y = 0:5. Figure 1 reports exactly the patterns that Table 1
has showed in numerical terms: the parameter combination  = 1:5, y = 0:06 delivers
the highest level of volatility within the range and a better stabilization results can be
obtained by setting y = 0:5 for all  2 [0; 10]. This is a striking results, because a
combination of monetary policy parameters like  = 1:2, y = 0:06 turns out to be
7Following the suggestions by Cogley and Nason (1995), in order to avoid spurious business cycle
dynamics, I did not pass the time series results via Hodrik-Prescott lter. Thus, the numbers reported
in Tables 3-8 are the results (averaged) over 200 simulations. For a critique to the common practice of
H-P lter, see Cogley and Nason (1995).
8 In Figures 1-2 the scal policy parameter  1 has been set equal to 0:0055: The present paper focuses
on monetary policy function, given the scal policy reaction function parameters. It is clear, however,
that an high value of the scal policy parameter and an high value of the monetary policy parameter
correspond to the passive-active combinations in Leepers (1991) terminology.
9Each point of the Figure is obtained by varying  withing the grid [0,10] with increments 0.01.
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welfare maximizing in a simple model à la Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). These
results show that the inclusion of capital accumulation changes dramatically the role of
monetary policy in stabilization plans, by making the role of output much more important.
In Table 4 I report selected results for autocorrelations up to second order. By
increasing y, given  = 1:5, the autocorrelation of the ination rate increases, as well
as that of output and nominal rate. However, if monetary authority adopts an aggressive
ination rate policy, the autocorrelation function is lower, no matters how big is the value
for y.
y
autocorrelation 0.06 0.5
order y R  y R 
 = 1:5 1 .25 .24 .24 .57 .57 .33
2 .036 .023 .027 .41 .4 .13
 = 3 1 .18 .19 .24 .3 .31 .26
2 -.02 -.02 .03 .097 .11 .047
US 1 .98 .88 .87
2 .96 .8 .81
Table 4: Autocorrelations for model with Rule 1
If we compare the results obtained for the autocorrelations with US data,we nd that
the model lacks of a substantial internal propagation mechanism. In fact, autocorrelation
of order 1 from data is .98, while from the model we nd only .25 (if  = 1:5; y = :06)
and .57 when (if  = 1:5; y = :5).
An interesting fact to be noted is that by increasing the output targeting parameter
variables autocorrelation increases with respect to the case with y = :06. Moreover,
when  = 3, we observe a considerable drop in the output autocorrelation after the rst
period10 .
The results obtained in Table 4 di¤er substantially from what has been collected by
Casares and McCallum (2001), who nd a level of autocorrelation implied by the model
much closer to the empirical values.
Let us move on to study the empirical e¤ects of parameters choice for a model including
an expected ination targeting rule, like Rule 2. Table 5 reports the volatility results
of the ination targeting rule, for the same range of parameters already employed in the
analysis of the simple Taylor rule in Tables 3 and 4.
10The trend showed by the autocorrelations in Table 3 is stable also for all the other combinations of
 = 5, 10 and  = 3; 5, 10, not reported here, but available upon request.
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y
0.0 0.06 0.5 3 5 10
y 6.063 3.45 .36 .055 .033 .0164
 = 1:5 R 5.68 4.3 .69 1.042 1.031 1.031
 0.73 .613 .1021 .033 .029 .0274
y 1.71 1.36 .43 .063 .036 .018
 = 3 R 1.29 1.14 .709 1.078 1.056 1.04
 .11 .11 .076 .0341 .030 .027
y .964 .86 .43 .076 .043 .021
 = 5 R .971 .94 .78 1.12 1.093 1.069
 .046 .048 .051 .034 .030 .028
y .544 .52 .38 .114 .067 .0324
 = 10 R .9351 .93 .88 1.16 1.15 1.09
 .018 .019 .026 .033 .0311 .0289
y 0.77
US R .078
 .66
Table 5: Expected Ination Rule
When  = 1:5, y = 0:06, the model
11 delivers a volatility of ination equal to 3.45
(in the data is 0.77), and a volatility of nominal interest rate equal to 4.3 (0.078 from data).
On the other hand, if we raise the value of y up to 0.5, we nd that the combination
 = 1:5, y = 0:5 implies a volatility of ination equal to 0.36, and a volatility of nominal
interest rate equal to 0.69.
From Table 5 we observe a pattern of output, nominal rate and ination volatility
for some aspects similar to what we have seen in Table 3, without the expectation terms
included.
However, the lowest degree of output and ination volatility can be obtained with
 = 1:5, y = 10. Therefore, output targeting is more important with a monetary
rule including an expected ination target. This result is not in accord with what other
authors have found in terms of welfare maximization and opens up for di¤erent policy
recommendations. It should be stressed that given a value for y, it is not true that
raising  helps to stabilize output, nominal rate and ination rate. Even in this case we
note the same pattern already considered for the previous model: when y = 0:5 is kept
xed, by varying  we obtain an increase of output volatility until when  = 5; 10.
The impact on volatility induced by changes in the ination target coe¢ cient is rep-
resented also in Figure 2, where the evolution of standard deviation of output, nominal
rate and ination rate is plotted for increments of . Figure 2 replicates the results
reported in Table 6: the dark line is for  = 1:5, y = 0:06, while the dashed line is for
 = 1:5, y = 0:5. The dashed line always dominates the dark line, even if by raising
 the volatility of all variables is immediately under control as long as  > 1.
11Recall that y = 0:06 is the welfare-maximizing value chosen by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
Volatility Matters: Taylor Rules and Capital Accumulation 17
Autocorrelations up to second order are reported in Table 6 for the model simulated
with Taylor Rule 2.
y
autocorrelation 0.06 0.5
order y R  y R 
 = 1:5 1 .43 .98 .47 .64 .98 .48
2 .22 .96 .28 .47 .97 .27
 = 3 1 .32 .97 .53 .46 .98 .44
2 .11 .93 .37 .26 .96 .23
US 1 .98 .88 .87
2 .96 .8 .81
Table 6: Autocorrelations for model with Rule 3
From Table 6 we observe that the model with Rule 3 shows an higher autocorrelation
pattern for output, ination and nominal rate, if compared with the results obtained for
the model simulated with Rule 1. In particular, the autocorrelation of the ination rate
is .47 for  = 1:5, y = 0:06 and reaches 0.53 for  = 3, y = 0:06, a value considerably
bigger than what has been obtained by other papers in this literature.
Summing up. From the results collected in Tables 3-6, we found that an aggressive
ination targeting policy induces an excess of volatility. This e¤ect can be mitigated by
setting an higher output targeting coe¢ cient.
The model here studied considers a multiplicity of shocks: three out of four are de-
mand shocks (transaction cost, public expenditure and monetary policy shock), while the
technology shock is a typical supply-side shock. In case of demand shock, it is clear that
by raising feedback parameters in monetary policy reaction function tends to eliminate
the impact of such shocks.
However, supply shocks require a more moderate response from monetary authority.
In the simulation here considered, all the shocks are given equal importance, so the results
come from the need to control demand shocks. On the other hand, the results do not
change dramatically if the predominance were assigned to supply shocks, as it will be
discussed in the analysis of impulse-response functions.
5.2. Sensitivity analysis. It has been argued12 that the role of distortions in the
economy is crucial in determining the optimality of a given rule. To have a metric of the
degree of distortions existing in the economy, I follow the approach taken by Lubik (2001)
who denes a variable - called the degree of distortions - formed by the ratio of the
elasticity of substitution among nal goods  and the cost of price adjustment parameter
p. Higher is the ratio =p, less distorted is the economy, because an high level of goods
substitutability (lower markup) is associated to a low value for the price adjustment cost
parameter.
12See Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
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To explore these issues, I reported in Tables 7 and 8 standard deviations of output
(y), nominal rate (R) and ination rate ()for two di¤erent values of the distortion
index. The rst column in normal characters indicates a ratio =p = 0:15, obtained
with  = 1:5, p = 10. The numbers in italics are obtained for an economy with  = 11,
p = 0:001. Of course, the former case corresponds to an heavily distorted economy
(where the markup is equal to 3), while the gures in italics are for an economy very close
to perfect competition (with a markup equal to 1.05).
y
Volatility 0.0 0.06 0.5 3
y 11.08 19.59 3.36 6.88 .37 .45 .07 .1
 = 1:5 R 4.81 3.22 1.56 1.13 .27 .07 .046 .027
 3.25 2.14 0.96 1.00 .13 .13 .09 .2
y .89 4.68 .73 3.69 .27 .85 .13 .083
 = 3 R .69 .76 .54 .60 .23 .14 .06 .023
 .25 .25 .19 .27 .08 .16 .12 .065
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis, Rule 1.
In general, a more distorted economy shows a lower degree of volatility when a policy
rule like Rule 1 is introduced in the model. Thus, we may conclude that a more distorted
economy calls for a more interventionist policy rule. In fact, if  = 1:5 and y = 0:5 we
observe a lower degree of volatility for all the variables, if compared with the analogous
parameter combination for the less distorted economy ( = 10).
Let us look now at the same type of results when monetary policy rule is given by
Rule 2, with expected ination targeting.
y
Volatility 0.0 0.06 0.5 3
y 4.62 6.05 1.87 2.6 .31 .38 .054 .056
 = 1:5 R 5.49 5.7 2.43 2.68 .63 .69 1.04 1.047
 .47 .76 .21 .39 .047 .10 .022 .034
y 1.018 1.75 .78 1.4 .27 .44 .0543 .63
 = 3 R 1.15 1.31 1.02 1.15 .68 .71 1.07 1.078
 .077 .12 .065 .11 .03 .08 .021 .035
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis, Rule 3.
In Table 8 with an heavily distorted economy, we observe a set of results similar to
those reported in Table 4. An interesting fact is given by the lower degree of volatility
associated to a more distorted economy including a monetary policy rule with an output
targeting coe¢ cient higher than the optimal value considered in the literature. In fact,
higher is the number of distorsions, bigger is the emphasis on the real-side stabilization
goals that a policy rule should have, to contribute also to stabilize the ination rate.
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6. Model Dynamics
How parameters of monetary policy reaction function a¤ects the response of the variables
of the economy and the adjustment towards the initial steady state, after an exogenous
technological shock ?
To answer this question, we can examine the impulse-response pattern for output,
nominal rate and ination under di¤erent parameter congurations of the monetary policy
reaction function. In what follows, I am going to concentrate on the impact e¤ect derived
from ination targeting parameter, given its importance in the recent monetary policy
literature.
In Figure 2, column, I reported the plot of impulse response functions for output,
nominal rate and ination rate for Rule 1: the dark line is drawn for  = 1:5; y = 0:5;
the dashed line is for  = 5; y = 0:5, and the dashed/dotted line is for  = 10;
y = 0:5, while in the right column I reported similar responses for the model including
Rule 2.
Let us focus now on the left column. The impact of a positive technological shock
is expansionary: output raises, labor e¤ort increases, consumption increases, and invest-
ment in physical capital increases. In particular, an expansionary technological shock
is deationary. The deationary e¤ect is due to the fact that the steady state level of
output is ine¢ cient (actual output is below potential output) because of the presence of
monopolistic competition and transaction costs (positive in steady state).
If monetary authority reacts too aggressively to ination, by setting  = 5; y = 0:5
(dashed line), from Figure 3 (left column) we observe that the e¤ect is still expansionary
and deationary, but output, nominal rate and ination rate all show larger swings before
turning back to their steady state position. For example, output shows an expansionary
peak which is even stronger than in the case with  = 1:5; y = 0:5 (dark line), but it
passes through a recession before reaching the steady state level.
When  = 10; y = 0:5 the results are, in some sense reverted, because the expan-
sionary technological shock determines a recession instead than an expansionary e¤ect:
nominal interest rate shows large swings for any observed movement of the ination rate.
This determines a recession in response to a positive technological shock. In this case,
monetary authority reacts so strongly that it is not possible to take advantage of the
positive technological expansion.
Let us compare these results with the case under expected ination targeting. In the
right column of Figure 2 are plotted the impulse response function for the model including
Rule 2 in (28). The dark line is plotted for  = 1:5; y = 0:5; the dashed line is for
 = 5; y = 0:5, and the dashed/dotted line is drawn for  = 10; y = 0:5. The
qualitative responses of variables are not dissimilar to what has been observed with Rule
1. On the other hand, if  = 5; y = 0:5 the expansionary e¤ect due to the technology
shock is washed out by the strong reaction of the monetary authority. The same is true
when  = 10; y = 0:5.
Thus, the adoption of the expected ination target implies a reduced degree of volatility
of the variables, but an higher sensitivity of the variable response to changes in the
parameters of monetary policy rules.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper I have studied the operational performance of a set of simple monetary policy
rules à la Taylor in a model with capital accumulation and nominal and real rigidities.
In fact, with a small value of output targeting coe¢ cient, monetary authority is not
completely successful in stabilizing the volatility of output, nominal rate and ination
only by acting on the ination targeting coe¢ cient. Moreover, a too strong concerns
towards ination rate relatively to output reduces the ability of monetary authority to
control ination volatility and determines a stronger reaction with respect to an exogenous
shock hitting the economy.
The model is also able to provide better statistics for ination persistence than what
has been shown in the other literature.
These results contrasts with the conclusion obtained in models with a naive modelling
of rigidities and intertemporal trade-o¤s that an optimal monetary policy function should
posit a disproportional weight on the ination rate rather than on output.
The work here analyzed calls for further generalizations with respect to the way of
modelling nominal rigidities (especially with respect to wage rigidities) and for the analysis
of distortionary taxation.
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